The current effort of the Democrat Party to subvert the Constitution by abolishing the Electoral College results from both massive misology and terminal political solipsism. Shakespeare said it best in Coriolanus “Crows pecking at eagles.” Both parties have attempted abolishing the Electoral College when the results were not in their favor (see blog: An Invitation to National Chaos: Abolish the Electoral College dated January 22, 2021). In anticipation of that, Madison also argued for the greatest number of diverse political parties – specifically to diffuse the power of collusion.
In his January 5, 1967 inaugural address as governor of California, Ronald Reagan said “Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never more than one generation away from extinction. It is not ours by way of inheritance; it must be fought for and defended constantly by each generation, for it comes only once to a people. And those in world history who have known freedom and then lost it have never known it again. Knowing this, it is hard to explain those among us who even today would question the people’s capacity for self-government.”
“Between October 1787 and August 1788, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison wrote a series of essays that appeared in various New York newspapers under the pseudonym “Publius.” The Federalist, as the combined essays are called, was written to combat anti-federalism. [The New York Times and the governor of New York were editorializing against ratification of the Constitution – like they do now]. Hoping to persuade the public of the necessity for the Constitution, “Publius” gave excellent arguments for adopting it and discarding the Articles of Confederation. The Federalist stresses the urgent need for an adequate central government and the ease with which the republican form of government would be adapted to the large expanse of territory and widely divergent interests found in the United States. It was immediately recognized as the most powerful defense of the new Constitution and hailed as a classic in constitutional theory [as it still is]. Jefferson called The Federalist “the best commentary on the principles of government which ever was written.” Of the eighty-five essays, John Jay (future U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice) wrote five, Madison twenty-six, and Hamilton fifty-one. The authorship of the other three is in doubt. [The Federalist Papers are credited with turning the tide of public opinion in favor of ratification].” – Annals of America, Volume 3; p. 216
The Federalist No. 10 (Madison):
“Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.
Complaints are everywhere heard that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of [special] interested and overbearing majorities. The prevailing and increasing distrust of public officers and alarm for private rights mostly derives from a factious spirit tainting our public administration.
By faction I mean a number of citizens, whether a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse, passion, or interest adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing faction: by removing its causes; or by controlling its effects.
There are also two methods of removing the causes of faction: by destroying the liberty essential to its existence; or by giving every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. The first remedy is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. It is no less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life than it would be to wish the annihilation of air which is essential to animal life.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other. The diversity in the [abilities] of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these [differing abilities] is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal [abilities] of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, an attachment of different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power; have, in turn, divided mankind into parties; inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities that, where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, and many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause because his interest would certainly bias his judgment and corrupt his integrity. With greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation but so many judicial determinations, not only concerning the rights of single persons but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? What are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? In a proposed law concerning private debts the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail.
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The inference is that the causes of faction cannot be removed and the only solution is in controlling its effects.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration. It may convulse the society. But it will be unable to execute and mask it violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice its ruling passion or interest both to the public good and the rights of other citizens.
By what means is this objective attainable? Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity coincide, neither moral nor religious boundaries will prevent it. They are insufficient to prevent the injustice and violence of individuals and lose their influence in reverse proportion to the number of the majority involved in the oppression.
In a pure democracy [without an Electoral College] no society has a cure for faction. In such a society, a common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; and there is nothing to check the sacrifice of the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Such democracies have always been turbulent and contentious; have never been compatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have been as short lived as they were violent.
“Theoretical politicians” who propose this kind of government have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, would at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. [Such has never existed in the history of Mankind despite the coercive insistence of Karl Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Joe Biden, Kamala Harris or AOC. See the Kirkpatrick Doctrine].
Let us examine the points in which a republic differs from pure democracy. The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are; first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first is to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely sacrificed to temporary or partial considerations. Under a republic, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves. On the other hand, the result may be the opposite: Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages [of the citizens] then betray the interests of the people [like today’s Republican Party]. The question is whether small or extensive republics are better for the election of proper guardians of the public weal. The answer is yes for two obvious reasons:
First, however small the republic, the representatives must be a certain number to guard against the cabals of a few. However large a republic may be, they must be limited to a certain number to guard against the collusion of a multitude.
Secondly, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established character. There are disadvantages to both sides. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and interests. By reducing too much, the representative becomes too attached to local interests and unable to comprehend great and national concerns. The federal Constitution provides a happy medium in this respect: the great and national concerns are referred to the national, the local concerns remain with the state legislatures.
The other difference is the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government. Factious combinations are less to be dreaded in the republican than the democratic form. The smaller the society the fewer will be the separate parties and interests. The more a majority may form within the same party, the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority. The smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily they can execute their plans of oppression.
***Extend the sphere and you include a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or, if such a motive exists, it will be more difficult [for them to collude in their oppression. {as it is now with the so-called ‘Two-Party’ system.} Where there is a consciousness of unjust and dishonorable purposes, it is always checked in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary. A greater variety of parties affords a greater security against any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest. It provides greater obstacles to the accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and self-interested majority. …”
See also: The Parties Versus The People: How to Turn Republicans and Democrats into Americans by Mickey Edwards
