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- Reads like a bought-and-paid-for-Politically-Correct-State Department Phd dissertation. Or Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China or Peter Schran’s Guerrilla Economy: The Development of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, 1937-1945 in which the authors also drank the PC Kool-Aid.
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- OK! OK! So you were Petraeus’ advisor! I heard you the first time! Might want to rethink that claim to fame after seeing Petraeus dribble the Super Bowl coin toss like someone with cerebral palsy.
- DK Spends an inordinate amount of verbage impressing us with his street creds. Sir Robert K. Thompson, Galula, Frank Kitson and the rest of the real counter-insurgency experts of the ‘50s and ‘60s never did this. They also would never be seen interviewed wearing house slippers and a red velvet smoking jacket.
- Kilcullen’s “Accidental Guerrilla” is the Afghan version of McNamara’s analysis of Vietnam.
- “The most intriguing thing about this battle was not the Taliban, though; it was the behavior of the local people. One reason the patrol was so heavily pinned down was that its retreat, back down the only road along the valley floor , was cut off by a group of farmers who had been working in the fields and, seeing the ambush begin, rushed home to fetch their weapons and join in. Three nearby villages participated, with people coming from as far as 5 kilometers away, spontaneously “marching to the sound of the guns”. (Afghans don’t “march”…but it’s a nice piece of literary license for dramatic effect). There is no evidence that the locals cooperated directly with the Taliban; indeed, it seems they had no directly political (PC for ignoring Islamism) reason to get involved in the fight (several, questioned afterward, said they had no love for the Taliban and were generally well-disposed toward the Americans in the area). But, they said, when the battle was “right there in front of them” (from 5 kms away?), how could they not join in? Did we understand just how boring it was to be a teenager in a valley in central Afghanistan? This was the most exciting thing that had happened in their valley in years. It would have shamed them to stand by and wait it out, they said.”
- Afghans remind me of the Somali creed:
- Me and my tribe against Somalia,
- Me and my clan against the tribe
- Me and my family against the clan
- Me and my brother against the family
- Me against my brother
- Anyone who’s read Afghan history knows Afghanistan is permeated with valleys with only one way in and out. They’ve used this tactic since Alexander (“The Laws of History are as Immutable as the Laws of Physics” – Isaac Asimov). American military never learns from history -they’re too busy bankrupting the nation so they can make general. If they had they could have killed a lot more of those bastards by sending the “bait” up the dead-end canyons …and having pre-registered artillery, A-10s, or Apaches, etc. (or all the above) just off station ’til the MFers started “marching toward the sound of gunfire” at the entrance. Alexander would’ve loved to have had some of that shit!
- Does FIVE KILOMETERS count as “nearby”? It would take some time and effort to “spontaneously ‘march’ [they probably rode in trucks, cars and motorbikes] five kilometers.
- “No evidence locals cooperated ‘directly’ with the Taliban”. Of course not! Locals aren’t going to cut off their “meal ticket” – Americans- by saying they work with the Taliban. They’re Muslims! Lying to infidels is in their DNA.
- “…how boring it was to be a teenager…” I doubt it was only teenaged males who “spontaneously…marched to the sound of guns.”
- “…the most exciting thing…” and “It would have shamed them to …wait it out.”
- Killcullen accepts at face value what they are telling him.
- Joining in an attack on American soldiers because they were “bored” is Muslim dissembling (bullshit).
- They were obligated under Koranic Law to aid their Muslim brothers in killing infidels. Not doing so, according to Mohammed, subjects them to the same punishment as the infidels.
- At a minimum joining in on the attack offered the opportunity to share in the spoils of pillaging weapons, equipment, and money from dead “rich” Americans. There was money to be made by joining on the attack! This makes them Opportunistic MFers – NOT “Accidental” Guerrillas!
- Afghans (being a war-like culture) the “shame” of not joining in was due more to their Muslim machismo than to boredom.
- If they “had no love for the Taliban” and were “generally well-disposed toward the Americans” why didn’t the locals “spontaneously march” to the AID of the Americans instead of the Taliban?
- This incident is just one of thousands in the last ten years pointing to the futility of the American presence in Afghanistan – and putting the lie to “exporting democracy” and “nation-building.”
- Afghans remind me of the Somali creed:
Afghans are anything but “accidental” guerrillas. It ignores centuries of a culture that considers warfare –especially against infidels- a religious obligation and a rite of passage into manhood. At best they are dedicated Muslim jihadists. At worst they are simply opportunistic bandits. Or both.
Kilcullen’s premise is “Regardless of the outcome in Iraq, Afghanistan still presents an opportunity for a positive long-term legacy for Western intervention, if it results in an Afghan state capable of effectively responding to its people’s wishes and meeting their needs” (p.44). This military-industrial-complex grand larceny would be laughable if it weren’t so monumentally, tragically wrong…as wrong as Bush, Jr.’s contrived invasion of Iraq. Just like Vietnam!
For the Truth (if you can handle the truth!) read the introduction and first chapter of Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from Communism to Islamism.
I’m going to affect a foreign accent so I can cash in on the Pentagon’s refusal to learn from history.