Mr. President,
Your opinion “there is no violation because no damage was done” is not a legal defense supporting acquittal in a general court-martial or some other form of career-ending punishment that would certainly happen to any lesser ranking member of the Armed Services under the Uniform Code of Military Justice if they had committed the same Operational Security (OPSEC) violations.
I spent several years within the Special Operations community both as an operator and as a counterintelligence officer. Part of my duties on several occasions was Security Manager for the unit I was assigned.
My last assignment in the Army was as a Master instructor at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center & School, Ft. Huachuca, AZ. Among many other things within the DOD’s Intelligence Architecture I taught Army Regulation 380-5: Army Information Security Program.
This includes:
Chapter 2-8: Classification Criteria: “The OCA (Originating Classification Authority) determines whether the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, and the information falls within one or more of the following categories specified in EO 13526:
a. Military plans, weapon systems, or operations,
b. FGI (Foreign Government Information/Intelligence),
c. Intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology
d. Foreign relations or foreign activities of the U.S. (including confidential sources).
e. Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security.
f-h. omitted
3–6. Exemption from automatic declassification:
(6) Reveal information, including foreign government information that would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government, or to ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States.
(1) Reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development.
The unauthorized disclosure of a major operation plan to occur within 72 hours to an uncleared civilian source would certainly result in a 15-6 investigation (the military equivalent of a grand jury).
According to the published full text of the Houthi PC small group initiated by Michael Waltz, (https://www.reddit.com/r/Fauxmoi/comments/1jkbt98/here_is_the_entire_transcript_of_messages_from/#lightbox) the following information was discussed:
1. the President of the United States gave a “Go” for a major military attack against a terrorist group to take place within 72 hours.
During this time and prior to the actual attack:
2. The timeline for the attack – and its subsequent phases -was discussed.
3. The disclosure of the U.S. technological advantage in weapons systems was discussed.
4. Types of weapons systems and time frames for their use was discussed.
5. Reference was made of the most critical “non-human” method of intelligence was discussed (Houthi’s “main missile man”). This could have tipped off the main target to the fact he was being surveilled enabling him to alter his pattern of life thwarting the neutralizing of the Number 1 priority target. Reminiscent of the New York Times publishing Osama bin Laden’s cell phone number.
6. Discussion of relations with foreign countries that proved embarrassing to the U.S.
All these OPSEC violations would have ruined anyone else’s career.
But, as everyone who has ever served in the military knows, it’s not what you know – it’s who you know that ensures promotion (and protection).
By the grace of God, the Trump-hating media mouth was not a traitor or Iran would have provided the Houthi’s weaponry in time to adversely affect the outcome of the attacks.
Shared with a hostile source, the Houthi’s had plenty of time to react to the planned attack.
NOTE TO SECDEF HEGSETH: Your denigration of the American public’s knowledge is unappreciated. More of us are paying attention to who our threats are than you apparently believe. Not surprising from a man who used military service as a springboard for a political career.
Dodging that bullet, Mr. President, if I were your Chief of Staff, I would delve deeply into why someone in your cabinet had that media mouth – a person who actively works against you and your agenda – on his Signal Account. And remove that mole immediately.
Other violations committed by Waltz:
Chapter 9-2: Reporting and Notifications:
Anyone finding classified material out of proper control, will take custody of and safeguard the material, if possible, and immediately notify the appropriate security authorities. In all cases, the individual’s immediate supervisor is to be notified.
b. Any person who becomes aware of the possible loss or potential compromise of classified information will immediately report it to the commander, SM, or other official the commander may direct.
c. omitted
d. Security incidents involving the following will be reported immediately through command channels to DCS, G–2,
(DAMI–CD). Where appropriate, a preliminary report will be provided outlining the facts, particularly when the fact of the incident may become public or attract media attention. DCS, G–2, (DAMI–CD) will be notified of:
(1) omitted
(2) An unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the public media. See DODM 5200.01, Volume 3 for further procedures and information required in the notification. …
(3) Any violation wherein properly classified information is knowingly, willfully, or negligently disclosed to unauthorized persons or information is marked or is continued as classified in violation of this regulation:
(a) Is reported to the oversight committees of Congress;
(b) May attract significant public attention;
(c) omitted
(d) Reveals a potential systemic weakness in classification, safeguarding, or declassification policy or practices.
(4) omitted
(5) A security failure or compromise of classified information relating to any defense operation, system, or technology that is likely to cause significant harm or damage to U.S. national security interests, for which Congressional reporting may be required by 10 USC 2723.
9–4. Classified information appearing in the public media
a. If classified information appears in the public media, including public internet sites, or if approached by a representative of the media, DA personnel will not make any statement or comment that confirms the accuracy of or verify the classified status of the information. Personnel will report the approach immediately to the appropriate command, security, and public affairs personnel.
(1) It is essential that DA personnel are careful to neither confirm nor deny the existence of classified information or the accuracy of information in the public media.
SecDef Hegseth’s justification to the media why the Signal leak was not classified violated this regulation – as well as legally erroneous. At best it was a valiant but futile effort at ass covering – something us lower ranking minions don’t enjoy.
9–10. Negligence
DA personnel are subject to administrative or disciplinary sanctions if they negligently disclose, to unauthorized persons, information properly classified under EO 13526 or any prior or subsequent order. Administrative or disciplinary action against U.S. military personnel can be pursued, but is not required. Administrative or disciplinary action against Army
Civilian personnel can be pursued under Army Civilian personnel regulations, …”
“All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others?” – George Orwell, 1984;
